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Abstract— Emergence appears in the literature as related to 
self-organization and novelty. For many authors it is the result of 
multiple interactions among agents within a system, which 
generate phenomena that could not be understood, nor 
anticipated, through the analysis of the elements and their 
behaviors in isolation. For others, emergent phenomena are 
related to fundamental novelty and, thus, to creativity. These two 
formulations of emergence can be traced back to the 
experimental work of some key early cybernetic experimental 
devices by Ross Ashby, Grey Walter and Gordon Pask. As a 
group, the devices illustrate the potential of both formulations of 
emergence and of its combination. As such, they can help with 
the elaboration of a framework to understand emergence in the 
context of interactive art and communication, both to analyze its 
presence in interactive systems and to design systems that aim to 
generate them.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Emergence appears in the academic literature as related to 
two phenomena: self-organization and the appearance of 
novelty. For many authors it is the result of multiple 
interactions among agents within a system, in the form of 
patterns of behavior of the system as a whole. Such patterns 
are emergent phenomena in the sense that they could not be 
understood, nor anticipated, through the analysis of the 
elements and their behaviors in isolation [1-3]. This is the 
classic idea of the whole being more than the sum of its parts. 
The explanations are usually articulated in terms of different 
levels of complexity, in which the lower levels (the parts) 
generate processes that appear at the upper levels (the whole) 
as emergent, i.e. not explainable by a classic cause-effect 
relationship. Typical examples include the behavior of ant 
colonies and their social complexity, chemical clocks in non-
equilibrium thermodynamics, or the complexity generated 
from the simple rules of cellular automata. For others, 
emergent phenomena are related to fundamental novelty and, 
thus, to creativity. For them, emergence is synonymous to the 
appearance of new functions or behaviors in a known system 
[4-7]. 
These two formulations of emergence can be traced back 
to the experimental work of some key early cybernetic 
experimental devices: Ross Ashby’s Homeostat, Grey 
Walter’s tortoises and Gordon Pask’s Musicolour, 
electrochemical devices and Colloquy of Mobiles. These 
authors are known to have anticipated both Artificial Life [8-
10] and the context for emergence to acquire a central role in 
the scientific discourse [11, 12]. This anticipation is both 
thematic and in the bottom up approach of generating complex 
behaviors from simple interconnected parts. Walter was 
explicit in this objective: his tortoises were built to prove how 
only a very limited set of connections could result in a 
behavior that resembled something as complex as animal 
behavior [13]. The Homeostat and the Colloquy resonate with 
the idea of self-organization, as they too rely on the chaining 
of simple behaviors to generate a complex whole (process). In 
parallel to that, these cybernetic devices usually sought to 
attain the appearance of novel behavior. This is most clear in 
Pask’s electrochemical devices, but also in the tortoises the 
occurrence of unexpected behaviors was noted by Walter.  
As a group, the devices illustrate the potential of both 
formulations of emergence and of its combination. As such, 
they can help with the elaboration of a framework to 
understand emergence in the context of interactive art and of 
interactive communication, both to analyze its presence in  
interactive systems and to design systems that aim to generate 
them.    
 
II. INTERACTIVITY AND EMERGENCE 
Interactive art is a space where interaction is freed from 
the constraints of functionality, as artists experiment in the 
spectrum between randomness and predictability: the space of 
poetic interaction [14] where interactivity becomes a major 
aesthetic concern [15]. These interactive systems are usually 
programmed with a set of pre-specified behaviors that aim to 
engage with the user. Some attempts have been made to 
eliminate the constraint of pre-specification. Prominently, 
those originated within the Artificial Life (ALife) Art 
movement in the early 1990s, which proposed Emergent 
Interactive Behavior as a new paradigm to be explored [16].  
The goal of explicitly combining the ideas of emergence 
and interactive art originated in parallel with the appearance of 
Complexity Sciences in the late 1980s, and, in particular, of 
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Artificial Life. Emergent Interactive Behavior was proposed 
as a paradigm that aims to create systems that can behave 
beyond what is explicitly specified in their design [16]. I.e. 
these systems should exhibit behaviors that surprise their own 
designer. This element of surprise is not desirable in most 
cases when dealing with interactive devices. Functional 
interactivity is what one expects to find when using a word 
processor or a database interface. But in an artistic context 
interactivity becomes an idea to experiment with, and notions 
such as emergent interactive behavior or evolved behaviors 
became central for some of the ALife Art practitioners. 
However, ALife Art is not always about interactivity. It is 
a discipline at the intersection of science and art that has 
produced many simulated environments and animations. Many 
of the works produced by ALife artist are not concerned with 
interactivity. But there are also examples of interactive pieces, 
such as Simon Penny’s Petit Mal [17] and Sympathetic 
Sentience [18] or Ken Rinaldo’s Autopoiesis [19] among 
many others. 
This paper presents a line of work that is driven towards an 
understanding of emergence in the context of interactive art. 
The goal is to define a framework that is useful in order to 
discern the presence of emergent behavior and phenomena in 
interactive systems, both as self-organization and as the 
appearance of novelty, in the terms discussed below. A further 
goal will be to set up later the guidelines for designing systems 
that possess the conditions for such phenomena to present 
themselves. Both as self-organization and as generation of 
novelty, emergence is a compelling idea within the perspective 
of amplifying the behavioral possibilities of interactive art 
pieces, which are often strongly linked to pre-specified 
behaviors. As said above, the space of poetic interaction can 
be a very fertile ground for the exploration of the creation of 
such systems in an artistic context: art pieces that interact with 
the visitors in manners unanticipated even by their own 
designers. The goal is not new. It was made explicit in the 
1990s, but it can be traced back to the work of some the key 
British Cybernetic works mentioned in the introduction. 
 
III. EMERGENCE, SELF-ORGANIZATION AND NOVELTY 
In scientific discourse ‘Emergence’ appears as 
synonymous with non-reducible; in opposition to the 
pervasive reductionism of modern science. Emergent from 
meant not reducible to, and this association has survived to the 
present day, mainly around two (not mutually exclusive) 
ideas. First, as the possibility for fundamental novelty to 
appear: if something is not reducible to an underlying level of 
reality (e.g. thought to the physiology of the brain), it follows 
that some concept of newness applies. This produces vast 
ontological discussions in philosophy, but becomes less 
problematic when considered epistemologically. Second, in 
relation to self-organization: for some, emergence is not 
necessarily linked to novelty (i.e. an effect continues to be 
emergent after it has been initially observed). It is a result of a 
myriad of local interactions among agents manifested as a 
pattern of behavior in a superior (group) level. 
Historically, the concept of emergence didn’t become a 
concern in academic discourse until the mid–ninetieth century, 
when John Stuart Mill used the concept to distinguish different 
types of causation. In an analogy of how, in physics, forces 
can accumulate when calculated as vectors into a final 
resulting force, Mill proposed the principle of Composition of 
Causes, as the case when the effect of several causes is the 
result of the sum of their separate effects. In contrast, there are 
cases in which this principle does not apply. In Mill’s words, 
there is a breach, a gap in the continuity of causes: “there are 
laws which, like those of chemistry and physiology, owe their 
existence to a breach of the principle of the Composition of 
Causes” [20]. I.e. some laws and effects in a particular level of 
complexity (e.g. chemistry) were not, according to Mill, 
reducible to those in a more fundamental level (e.g. physics). 
Mill did not use the term emergence. It was the philosopher 
John Henry Lewes who, a little later, coined the term in 
discussing Mill’s different types of causation, opposing 
resultant to emergent effects. 
After Mill and Lewes, the concept took for the first time a 
central role in some of the discourses debating evolution at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Prominently, and with 
direct connections to Mill’s theories, among the members of 
British Emergentism [21], which defended that reality is 
organized in different levels of complexity and that superior 
levels are not reducible to inferior ones. This movement 
flourished before the turn of the twentieth century and 
vanished with the advent of quantum mechanics, and partially 
because of it [21, 22]. Before that, the previous context 
allowed little room for such an idea, and after appearing it 
remained a marginal concept for a long period. Even when 
science was reshaped by the Twentieth Century revolutions of 
Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, emergence remained an 
outsider to scientific discourse. It wasn’t until the second part 
of the century, when a new scientific context was created, that 
emergence regained importance in the academic debate.  
The context for emergence to acquire an important role 
was first set in Cybernetics discourse on ‘self-organization’. 
The idea of self-organization is present in earlier Cybernetic 
works by Ashby and Walter, as discussed below. Later, it was 
explicit and rather ubiquitous in Second Order Cybernetics. 
Within Chaos Theory and Complexity Sciences (Dynamical 
Systems Theory, neural networks, Artificial Life, etc.) 
emergence and emergent properties were consolidated as a 
central scientific concern. 
Second Order Cybernetics was a label adopted by 
philosophically inclined cyberneticists during the early 70s, as 
they felt the need to distinguish themselves from the 
mechanistic approaches of computer sciences and engineering, 
which by then were starting to become fully independent from 
Cybernetics [23]. Second Order Cybernetics emphasized, in 
contrast, the importance of autonomy, self-organization and 
cognition, and a very important emphasis on the role of the 
observer in modeling a system. Indeed, the difference between 
first and second order has been also phrased as the difference 
between the Cybernetics of the observed systems and that of 
the observing systems [11]. 
Self-organization is the process by which a group of agents 
(particles, molecules, animals, robot parts…) generates, 
through local interactions, an observable pattern of organized 
behavior at the group level. This process is not directed or 
coordinated by any singular or specific group of agents. A key 
concept here, central to Second Order Cybernetics, is the role 
of the observer: patterns appear in respect to an observer who 
is analyzing the system, who usually has a different point of 
view from that of the agents. It is precisely this point of view 
what allows him or her to consider the events occurring at the 
group level. This is the most common formulation of 
emergence, the one that relates to the idea than the whole is 
more than the sum of the parts. Emergence and Self-
organization are interchangeable terms in some disciplines: 
self-organization is used to refer to the same phenomena in 
Cybernetics or Complex Systems Theory as emergence in 
Artificial Life. 
It is within this latter discipline, where emergence is a 
central concern, where efforts to define the term have arisen, 
e.g. [1-3, 6, 24]. For some [1, 25], emergence is basically 
equivalent to self-organization. Others do stress, in addition, 
the importance of the idea of novelty, combining both 
formulations [2, 26].  
Finally, there’s a group of authors who move away from 
formulations built around self-organization and focus on 
emergence as generation of novelty. Prominent among them, 
Peter Cariani [4, 5, 12, 27, 28, 30], who moves the theoretical 
weight of the discourse to an idea of emergence that links it to 
the generation of novelty within a system and, thus, to 
creativity. 
While some authors relate novelty to internal states of the 
observer, such as surprise [6] or wonder [29], Cariani 
articulates a discourse that aims to identify emergence as 
novelty in a given system in a way that can be scientifically 
communicated. His approach is epistemological and 
pragmatic. It is epistemological in the sense that Cariani is 
interested in how emergence can be perceived by an observer 
and accounted for. And it is pragmatic because his aim is to 
set up the foundations to build autonomous creative cybernetic 
devices; “systems that can autonomously find solution to 
combinatorically-complex and ill-defined problems” [27].  
Cariani’s approach is known as ‘emergence-relative-to-a-
model.’ He is concerned with how new functions can appear 
in systems or devices that perceive and act on their 
environment. This newness can only be accounted for 
scientifically if, first, the observer of the system defines the 
states and state-transitions of the system under observation by 
creating a model of it. Once this is done, these observations 
are used to make predictions on the futures states of the 
system. In this context, emergence occurs whenever 
unanticipated behaviors, states or functions appear: 
“emergence is the appearance of novel entities that in one 
sense or another could not have been predicted from what 
came before” [28]. 
The bases of Cariani’s modeling are how the system reads 
and acts on its environment (semantics), how it decides how to 
act according to this readings (syntactics), and how it 
evaluates the actions performed according to its goals 
(pragmatics). All these actions are performed according to the 
basic building blocks of what the system can operate with: 
primitives in Cariani’s terminology.  
Within this framework, Cariani identifies two ways in 
which emergence can occur. The first is Combinatoric 
Emergence, which consists in the appearance of new system 
function through new combinations of the primitives with 
which the system operates (e.g. genetic algorithms). The 
second is Creative Emergence, which is the appearance of new 
functions trough the introduction of new primitives in the 
computations. This second form of emergence, equivalent to 
the introduction of a new sensory organ in an animal species 
through the course of evolution, is extremely rare in artificial 
systems, and in fact Cariani identifies in his literature only one 
case: Gordon Pask’s electrochemical devices [5, 30]. Despite 
these difficulties in the case of artificial systems, however, 
Cariani opens a door to mixed computer-human systems (i.e. 
interactive systems) to be generators of this latter kind of 
emergence [5, 28]. 
 
IV. CYBERNETIC DEVICES 
The idea of a system exceeding the expectations of its own 
designer can be illustrated with the metaphor of the 
‘unpredictable black box’ [31]: the idea is that there is a part 
of the system that may remain invisible (or un-scrutinized) 
even to its own designer, as the concern is only in how the 
behavior of the system relates to its readings and how these 
relations change over time in creating new behaviors. 
This resonates with what Andrew Pickering has labeled the 
performative idiom of Cybernetics, as opposite to the 
representational idiom of traditional science. An idiom based 
on a performative ontology: “a decentered perspective that is 
concerned with agency –doing things in the world– and with 
the emergent interplay of human and material agency” [32]. In 
this context, he argues how Cybernetics assumes in fact an 
ontology that, contrary to the reductionist approach, assumes a 
certain degree of unknowability, as it “tries to address the 
problematic of getting along performatively with systems that 
can always surprise us” [11]. These are what Stafford Beer 
labeled exceedingly complex systems:  Systems that are 
neither predictable nor susceptible to treatment by the methods 
of modern science and engineering. Such systems, like the 
interior of the unpredictable black boxes, are unknowable to 
some degree. They are too complex to be grasped 
representationally, and they change over time, so that future 
behavior cannot be anticipated through current knowledge. 
Although the term was rarely used in Cybernetics, the 
links to emergence are clear. Understood within this context, 
the following cybernetic devices are examples of pre-
configuration of self-organization emergence and of 
emergence as generation of novelty. 
A. Ross Ashby’s Homeostat 
Norbert Wiener described the Homeostat as the “brilliant 
idea of the unpurposeful random mechanism which seeks for 
its own purpose through a process of learning” and qualified it 
as “one of the great philosophical contributions of the present 
day” [33]. It was, indeed, a machine with no purpose in 
regards to the classical sense in which machines have 
purposes. It was built on the late 1940s and early 1950s in 
order to interact with other homeostats, and to experiment 
with homeostasis by doing it. Ashby’s goal was to build a self-
regulating system, and he was successful in doing so. 
The homeostat was an electromechanical device that 
converted electrical inputs to electrical outputs, which 
consisted of four identical units [34]. In each unit, the input 
passed through a coil that was inside the machine, which 
generated a magnetic field that exerted a torque on a needle 
located at the top of the device, which rotated to one direction 
or another. The position of the needle was to be interpreted as 
the main variable indicating the state of the homeostat [11, 
32]. The unit could either be in a stable position, with the 
needle resting in a central position, or in an unstable one, with 
it going out of range (a deviation of above 45 degrees from the 
resting position), which provoked the circuitry to randomly 
switch to another state (another set of values in the circuitry) 
and seek for stability in it. If it didn’t find it, is switched again, 
and so on. 
Isolated, a homeostat unit did close to nothing. It was 
when connected with others that a system of dynamic 
feedback loops started to build up, thus forcing each unit to 
look for its own stability within a changing (dynamic) system, 
were each unit was affecting all others. As a group of several 
units, it was a way to prove what Ashby labeled ultrastability: 
a consequence of the process of adaptation of each unit to the 
system [34]. When the four units came to a stable state 
simultaneously, ultrastability had been reached. 
The homeostat as a system, as Wiener pointed out, lacked 
a purpose beyond its own search for stabilization. What was, 
therefore, the motive in its building? As Pickering points out, 
the homeostat was a proto-brain designed to model adaptive 
behavior, “a model of the brain as an adaptive controller of 
behavior” [32].  The search of each unit in the homeostat for a 
stable setting within the system is a process of adaptation. 
Each unit struggles, though its open ended search of 
possibilities, to find a sate that will be stable as it interacts 
with the other units, whilst the other units are performing the 
exact same search. Ultrastability, the moment in which all of 
the units come to a stable state (i.e., when the system attains 
homeostasis), can be understood here as the result of a self-
organizing process and, therefore, as an emergent property.  
Despite the limited number of units in Ashby’s description, 
we can imagine that the homeostat could theoretically grow its 
number and the system would behave in the same manner. The 
interactions are local. Each unit interacts solely with its 
neighboring units. It is the sum of all the interactions what 
causes ultrastabilty to appear, with no central command 
directing the operations and no individual unit having any 
advantage or stronger influence on the others. Thus, the 
process of ultrastabilization as a whole is a result of self-
organization.  
In this respect, Ashby succeeded in creating a machine that 
could go beyond a fixed repertoire of stimulus-response 
reactions [35], thus creating a system that was open-ended 
enough to constantly change responses. Despite the fact that 
the homeostat was itself not interactive in regards to an 
external user, it can be argued that in terms of internal 
interactivity (i.e., regarding one unit in respect of all the 
others) it went beyond the database paradigm of pre-specified 
behaviors, and moved towards a more complex approach of 
creation of non-predefined behaviors. 
B. Grey Walter’s Tortoises 
The robotic tortoises of Grey Walter, first presented in 
1948, were an example of how he understood the modeling 
practice: a pragmatic material experiment that would serve as 
the basis for and orderly and practical classification of 
complex phenomena [36]. The devices he built were two 
electromechanical automata that, by their shape, resembled 
tortoises. He dubbed them Elmer (for Electro MEchanical 
Robot) and Elsie (Electro mechanical robot, Light-Sensitive 
with Internal and External stability). 
The tortoises had two sensors, for light and touch, and two 
effectors, for crawling and for steering. They were powered by 
batteries that they carried with them, and had a hutch were 
these could be recharged. The technical details of the tortoises 
were described in detail by Walter himself [13, 37, 38] and by 
Owen Holland [8, 9], who reconstructed one of the tortoises 
and has defended importance of Walter’s work as a pioneer 
(an antecessor, in fact) of Artificial Life. Walter’s ideas are 
also at the heart of a work that became highly influential of the 
1990s robotics: Valentino Braitenberg’s Vehicles [39], first 
published in 1984, consisted on a series of thought 
experiments on how very simple assemblages of robotic parts 
(sensors, effectors and behaviors) could result in remarkably 
complex behavior. Despite de similarities in the approach, it is 
likely that Braitenberg wasn’t aware of Walter’s work, since 
the latter is not credited in the book. 
In terms of behavior, Elmer and Elsie’s main goal was to 
look for a light source. If it was not found, they would wander 
around the space while a touch sensor allowed them to avoid 
obstacles trough a very simple procedure: if they couldn’t 
move forward and detected that they were touching an 
obstacle, they would perform a series of little bumping 
movements until the pressure was released, therefore 
continuing their wandering movement. Along with these 
movements, a light sensor would be spinning around in cycles, 
looking for a light source. Once it was found, the whole device 
would steer and move towards the light, amplifying this action 
linearly with the intensity of the light source, until a certain 
threshold was reached. When this happened, the tortoise 
would saturate and turn away from the light and start over. 
When their batteries were low, however, the changes in the 
circuitry would drive them towards the brightest light possible. 
As it turns out, the hutch that Walter built for them to recharge 
their batteries was strongly illuminated. Thus, this behavior 
allowed them to go back home to recharge, and retain full 
autonomy.  
 
 
Figure 1. A replica of Walter’s tortoises. © Bristol Robotics Laboratory. 
From this simple scheme, as Walter himself soon noted, 
“the behavior of Elmer and Elsie [was] in fact remarkably 
unpredictable” [13]. This unpredictability was intentional in 
the design. When Walter described his devices, he pointed out 
that one of his main objectives was to experiment with one of 
the aspects of animal behavior: “the uncertainty, randomness, 
free will or independence so strikingly absent in most well-
designed machines.” The tortoises would exhibit different 
behaviors as the environment changed and they adapted to it. 
For instance, in some experiments lights were mounted on the 
tortoises. When they carried these light sources with them, 
they would interact with each other or with their image on a 
mirror in manners that resembled the behavior of an animal 
when it recognizes one of its own kind, as they cyclically 
approached and avoided each other (or its own image on the 
mirror). 
As Walter admitted, his robots were meant to only 
approximate animal behavior [40], but nonetheless he was 
convinced that this resemblance was perfectly valid to regard 
them as a model of behavior, of the adaptiveness of the brain 
to the environment or even, as he titled his 1950 Scientific 
American article, as An Imitation of Life. In any case, they are 
a very clear predecessor of Artificial Life and also a landmark 
in robotics, and the complexity of their behavior can be 
regarded as emergent (in the sense of self-organization 
emergence) in respect to the simplicity of the parts involved in 
generating them. Along these lines, Andrew Pickering 
describes them as having “emergent properties relative to what 
Walter had designed into them” [11]. The local interactions of 
the sensors with the circuitry generated the patterns of 
behavior that were not explicitly designed, but appeared only 
as the system was set in motion and the experimenter could 
observe them.  
The remarkable unpredictability of Elmer and Elsie’s 
behavior can be read as the appearance of these patterns of 
behavior that Walter observed and described in detail [8]. One 
didn’t know what Elsie or Elmer would exactly do, but could 
only expect them to behave according to one of the previously 
observed patterns. According to this, in the cases were a new 
pattern of behavior was discovered, the idea of emergence as 
generation of novelty could also be applied. Walter noted, for 
instance, that he had been taken by surprise by the tortoises’ 
behavior in front of the mirror and with the other tortoises 
[38]. These behaviors would, therefore, be emergent relative 
to the model of expected behavior that Walter had elaborated 
with his first observations. 
C. Gordon Pask’s Musicolour 
Pask’s first device, and one with capital importance on his 
path into cybernetics, was the Musicolour. Home-built at the 
beginning of the fifties, it anticipated the idea of computer 
visuals accompanying musical performances. I was inspired 
“by the concept of synaesthesia and the general proposition 
that the aesthetic value of a work can be enhanced if the work 
is simultaneously presented in more than one sensory 
modality” [41]. Neither of the ideas was new, but as Pask 
notes, at the early 1950s the idea of augmenting sound by light 
was not yet as overused as it would be in the psychedelic 
years. 
The Musicolour was first demonstrated in 1953. The 
machine, constructed largely out of war surplus analog 
electromechanical equipment, was essentially a transducer 
which, through the input of a microphone, generated a series 
of visuals from a “predetermined vocabulary of visual 
symbols; coloured forms which were projected on to a large 
screen in front of the performer and an audience.” As the 
experiments with it advanced, Pask lost interest in the idea of 
synesthesia and the focus shifted towards the learning 
capabilities of the device [41]. The Musicolour became a 
machine that engaged very strongly with the performer, rather 
than amused the audience, as musician and machine learned 
from each other as the performances advanced. This feedback 
loop “had an almost hypnotic effect upon the performer,” 
whilst, in contrast, it was sometimes disappointing to the 
audience. 
It is easy to understand how these two effects were related. 
The Musicolour, in its last versions, moved away from the 
linear relations between sounds and colors. Instead, it 
exhibited more complex behaviors. Most remarkably, it the 
performer became too repetitive in trying to provoke a 
particular response by the system, this would cease to respond, 
as if it got bored with the reiteration [32]. With this, it would 
encourage the performer to try something new, and thus to 
never repeat his or herself too much. As Pask noted, the effect 
of this complexity of behavior on the audience was rather 
negative. Whilst the performer could be aware of what was 
going on, the audience would perceive too much a degree of 
randomness in the relations between sounds and lights. The 
perceived randomness would cause them to lose interest in the 
device as a real-time generator of visuals interpreted as 
readings to the music. This fail to interest the public can also 
be read as a symptom of a pre-Cage audience. 
The performer of the Musicolour engaged in an experience 
that Pask described as a game in which the machine and 
human became one: “He trained the machine and it played a 
game with him. In this sense, the system acted as an extension 
for the performer with which he could co-operate to achieve 
effects that he could not achieve on his own” [41]. Thus, the 
coupling of the performer’s actions and the machine’s 
responses created a stability that was unattainable if one of the 
two parts was missing. In this respect, these stability, which in 
this case is the performance itself, would be emergent in the 
same way that the stability in Ashby’s homeostat is. Local 
interactions create a result that is not intentionally mediated by 
any of the parts in particular. In this respect, the Musicolour is 
a case of self-organizing emergence 
As an interactive artwork –possibly the first interactive 
artwork created– the Musicolour was also, at least 
theoretically, capable of generating novelty. If the Musicolour 
was open-ended enough, the new actions of the performer 
could result in non-previously observed responses by the 
system. The paradigm of agency it inherits from what 
Pickering labeled the performative idiom of cybernetics is not 
usually found in later digital interactive works, which are 
often strongly based on the database paradigm of pre-
configured responses. The Musicolour, instead, was built 
around the possibility of perpetual novelty, as the device was 
designed to constantly learn from those who interacted with it 
and change its behavior accordingly.  
D. The Electrochemical Devices 
In the 1950s, Gordon Pask started to work on a series of 
electrochemical computing devices or, as he liked to refer to 
them (focusing on their properties rather than on the materials 
they were built of): organic computers [11]. Pask’s 
electrochemical computing devices were extremely open-
ended systems with which he aimed to describe the process by 
which machines think. A conception of thinking that had little 
to do to what Alan Turing had proposed at the beginning of 
the same decade [42], but rather in the formation of conceptual 
categories that allow the thinking entity to separate different 
objects into them [43]. For Turing, thinking was roughly the 
equivalent of reasoning in terms of responses given to certain 
inputs (i.e. functioning as a black box). The machine which 
eventually passed the Turing test would do so because it 
would respond as if it processed equivalently to the process of 
a human intelligence, up to the point where it would 
mistakenly be taken by human. The enormous complexity of 
such device had to be implemented in its design from the 
beginning. Pask’s approach was radically different. The 
thinking of his device had very little to do with emulating 
human thinking or behavior (or logico-computational models 
thereof). Like Walter’s tortoises or Ashby’s Homeostat, the 
electrochemical ear was designed with very simple sensing 
and acting capabilities, and the complexity of behavior was 
expected to appear emergently through the combination and 
iteration of these simple assemblages.  
The electrochemical devices were intended to create a self 
generating and homeostatic control system. They consisted of 
various aqueous solutions of metallic salts, in which he 
introduced electrodes to apply current to them. As the current 
passed, a series of filaments of iron grew from the tip of the 
electrodes into the liquid. Pask called these groups of 
filaments ‘threads’. As they grew and encountered others, the 
threads ended up creating connections among the electrodes. 
These connections would account for the assemblage’s 
computation capabilities [11, 30]. 
Pask worked extensively on these assemblages, although 
in general the details of the exact compositions with which he 
worked remain obscure. By 1958, he had a working 
demonstrating device [30]. However, beyond the technical 
details, the explicitly sought open-endedness of the device is 
interesting. The goal was to create a machine, a control 
system, which was capable of creating its own relevance 
criteria. That is, that the relations among inputs and outputs 
would not be completely well-defined, but instead the device 
itself would be capable to choose to what it would react and 
how. It would evolve its own sensors “to choose, independent 
of the designer, those aspects of its external environment to 
which it would react” [30]. And indeed the device was capable 
of doing so. As he presented it in 1958, it could either be 
trained to recognize magnetic fields or sound. In about half a 
day, it was capable of adaptively grow its own connections in 
order to do so. In the case of sound, once this was done it 
could also rapidly gain the ability to distinguish between two 
different frequencies [44]: hence the reference of Cariani and 
Pask himself to it as an ear. 
The electrochemical ear is an important example in 
Cariani’s theory of emergence-relative-to-a-model. It is a 
proof that artificial systems that evolve their own sensors are a 
real possibility. The structural autonomy of Pask’s device 
allows it to be informationally open, with a degree of 
epistemic autonomy that allows it to choose its own relevance 
criteria. With this, in creating its own sensors the device is 
able to incorporate new observables into the system of 
computation, and thus, it is an example of what Cariani calls 
creative emergence. As said above, this is one of the two ways 
in which emergence as generation of novelty can be attained, 
but it is extremely rare to find in artificial systems. It is 
precisely this difficulty what makes Pask’s device such an 
important example. 
E. The Colloquy of Mobiles 
A last cybernetic device will be examined here nicely 
connects with the idea of understanding emergence in 
interactive art. Gordon Pask’s Colloquy of Mobiles is 
undoubtedly a case of (interactive) Artificial Life Art avant-la-
lettre. Not only because the theme of the piece, but also of its 
approach. The piece was presented in London at the 
historically unique exhibition Cybernetic Serendipity in 1968, 
curated by Jasia Reichardt. As Pask described it, it was an 
aesthetically potent environment. An environment that seeks 
the artistic enjoyment of the viewer or hearer, and that should 
be able to interest him or her into exploring it. The piece was 
aimed towards this goal. Among such environments Pask 
differentiated between those that were passive and those that 
were reactive, and proposed his installation as an attempt to go 
one step further in that direction (i.e. as an interactive piece)  
[45]. 
Five ‘mobiles’ hung from a platform that was suspended 
from the ceiling. Two of the mobiles had the ability to emit 
light beams, whilst the other three didn’t. Instead, they had 
mirrors to reflect them. The first kind of mobiles were “as a 
whimsy”, as Pask claimed, labeled as males and the second as 
females. Each of the mobiles was wired up to have a main 
goal, and would have to learn how to achieve it, either through 
competition of through collaboration with the other mobiles. 
Very much along the lines of Artificial Life Art, Pask built his 
system around the metaphor of sexual reproduction, or, rather, 
of mating rituals. Each mobile had two urges or drives that it 
would try to satisfy, labeled O and P, for the colors they 
represented them; orange and puce [10]. To reduce either of 
the drives, the male was required to project the corresponding 
light beam and to have it projected back to a specific part of its 
body. This was something for which it needed collaboration 
from a female, which was equipped with a mirror. The 
females, according to their current state, would also be 
required to fulfill either one or the other drive. So if there was 
a coincidence in the goals of male and female, they female 
would offer collaboration. During all this, the males would 
compete with each other, blocking the competitors signal in 
order to gain the attention of the females for themselves. 
Sound and different intervals of light beam would send 
different messages in quite a complex sequence of events, in 
which each mobile learned how to best satisfy its particular 
urges. 
 
Figure 2. The Colloquy of Mobiles. © Gordon Pask Archive at the Dept of 
Contemporary History, University of Vienna, Austria. 
The Colloquy as a whole was a self-organizing system, as 
local decisions and interactions created the overall behavior, 
which could be labeled as emergent in respect to the 
aggregation of local actions. But, at least theoretically, the 
door was open to combinatoric emergence through the 
participant’s interactions. Because of its set-up, the Colloquy 
offered the possibility for the visitor to the installation to 
intervene. Stepping into the installation space users could 
block light signals or redirect them with their own mirrors. As 
noted in [46], the women’s make-up mirrors were a good 
resource for interacting with the piece, and some visitors did 
spend significant amounts of time on it. Arguably, these 
visitors’ interventions might potentially cause new 
combinations in how the mobiles interpreted their 
environment, thus generating combinatorically emergent 
behavior. 
Thus the piece had a double level of activity, which 
resonates with latter interactive ALife inspired pieces such as 
Simon Penny’s Sympathetic Sentience [18] or Soler-Adillon’s 
Digital Babylon [47, 48]. First, there is the level of the piece 
running on its own, creating its own equilibrium of self-
organized behaviors. And second, there is the possibility for 
interaction, for the public to enter the space and affect the 
piece, creating with disturbances that enter the activity loop 
that forms the overall behavior of the system. The Colloquy is 
remarkable for anticipating some of the latter developments in 
computer art, Artificial Life Art, as mentioned above, or even 
the notion of real-time interactive installations (Myron 
Krueger’s responsive environments) as noted in [10], as Pask 
integrated in it the active participation of the audience in his 
aesthetically potent environment. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
Among the rediscovered aspects of Cybernetics, there are 
many concepts that, towards the end of the 1980s, would form 
the theoretical basis of Artificial Life: “Many of the ideas 
central to cybernetics reappear under slightly different 
terminology in artificial life discourse. Central to cybernetic 
thinking were questions of self organization and purposive 
behavior, the relationship of an entity to its (changing) 
environment, its real time response and adaptability –
interactions characterized as ‘feedback’. In artificial life, these 
ideas are clad in terms of autonomous agents, reactive insect 
like robots, simulated evolution in fitness landscapes, 
emergence and self-organizing criticality” [49]. 
Many of the devices described above anticipate not only 
Artificial Life but also Artificial Life Art. First, it is clear that 
some of the works of the cybernetitians anticipate it 
thematically, Walter’s tortoises being the most evident 
example. All the vocabulary and metaphors that Walter 
utilizes to describe the tortoises and its behaviors resonates 
with the descriptions that the ALife Art practitioners would 
adopt. Evidently enough, the devices themselves are called 
tortoises and even have names, and their parts are referred to 
as eyes or shell. Accordingly, their behaviors too are described 
as the tortoises feeling an obstacle, being independent or 
spontaneous, or learning [13, 37]. Gordon Pask’s Colloquy is 
also a clear example of how both the devices and their 
behaviors are described in Artificial Life Art terms: the males 
and females and their actions performed in order to fulfill their 
drives, seen as a clear metaphor as a mating dance between the 
two genders of a species. As it has been noted in [10], this 
anticipates too an elaboration of narratives to explain the 
behavior of the agents that were strongly gendered. 
Another aspect in which Ashby, Walter and Pask 
anticipate Artificial Life is in the bottom up approach in which 
they base their experiments. In all these cases the idea is to 
build simple systems capable of exhibiting complex behaviors. 
Walter was quite explicit in this objective in [13, 37]. The 
tortoises were built to prove how only a very limited set of 
connections could have a result that resembled something as 
complex as animal behavior. This bottom up approach is in 
fact an implementation of the idea of self-organization and, 
thus, a search for emergent behavior. Both this approach and 
the aim to generate unexpected behaviors in the devices, in the 
sense of not being fully pre-specified, represent pre-
configurations of the idea of emergence that would be 
articulated a few decades later.  
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